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Abstract
Mixed-criticality systems combine real-time components
of different levels of criticality, i.e. severity of failure, on
the same processor, in order to obtain good resource util-
isation. They must guarantee deadlines of highly-critical
tasks at the expense of lower-criticality ones in the case
of overload. Present operating systems provide inade-
quate support for this kind of system, which is of growing
importance in avionics and other verticals. We present an
approach that provides the required asymmetric integrity
and its implementation in the high-assurance seL4 mi-
crokernel.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, critical real-time systems use dedicated
microcontrollers for each function. With increasing
functionality and complexity of cyber-physical and other
real-time systems, this is creating space, weight and
power (SWaP) problems, which force consolidation onto
a smaller number of more powerful processors. For ex-
ample, top-end cars reached 100 processors a few years
ago [Hergenhan and Heiser, 2008]; with the robust pack-
aging and wiring required for vehicle electronics, the
SWaP problem is obvious, and a driver for the adoption
of multitasking OSes [AUT, 2015].
The potential for consolidation is limited unless it is
possible to safely co-host functions of different critical-
ity, where criticality is a well-established notion that rep-
resents the severity of failure [RTCA]. Certification stan-
dards require that safe operation of a particular compo-
nent must not depend on any less-critical components
[ARINC].
Such mixed-criticality systems (MCS) are becoming
the norm in avionics, but presently in a very restricted
form: the system is orthogonally portioned spatially
and temporally, and partitions are scheduled round-robin
with fixed time slices [ARINC]. This limits integra-
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Figure 1: Highly simplified autonomous aerial vehicle
architecture red is most critical, blue least.
tion and cross-partition communication, and implies long
interrupt latencies and poor resource utilisation. The
simple partitioning approach will not meet the require-
ments of future mixed-criticality systems [Barhorst et al.,
2009].
Fundamental to good resource utilisation in MCS is
the ability to over-commit safely: The system’s core in-
tegrity property is that deadlines of the highest critical-
ity tasks must be guaranteed, meaning that there is al-
ways time to let such tasks execute their full worst-case
execution time (WCET). This may be orders of magni-
tude larger than the typical execution time, and computa-
tion of safe WCET bounds for non-trivial software tends
to be highly pessimistic [Wilhelm et al., 2008]. This
means that most of the time the highly-critical compo-
nents leave plenty of slack, which should be available
to less critical components, but must be available to the
critical component when needed.
Such a system needs support for downgrading time-
liness guarantees selectively, least critical ones first. In
general, this cannot be achieved by simply giving the
most critical tasks the highest priority. Consider the
simplified architecture of an autonomous aerial vehi-
cle (AAV) in Figure 1. The most critical component
is the low-level flight control, which keeps the vehicle
stable and moving towards a waypoint. It executes ev-
ery 100 ms and normally takes about 10 ms but has a
WCET of 70 ms. Next critical are the mission plan, sen-
sor filtering and C&C components, which have execution
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rates of between 1 and 10 Hz, normally run for a com-
bined 200 ms every second but have a combined WCET
of 500 ms per second. The CAN bus, which connects a
video camera and various sensors of secondary impor-
tance, can deliver packets every 12.5 µs and does not
buffer.
If the critical components are given higher priority
than the CAN driver, it will drop many packets even dur-
ing normal operation, despite the system having suffi-
cient headroom to run everything. The standard realtime
(RT) scheduling approach is rate-monotonic priority as-
signment (RMPA) [Liu and Layland, 1973], which gives
highest priority to tasks with the shortest periods. RMPA
is easy to analyse and known to be optimal for fixed pri-
orities; it is highly desirable to retain it for MCS.
A further complication is that components of differ-
ent criticality must be able to communicate, and access
shared data [Burns and Baruah, 2013]. For example, the
AAV’s mission plan defines the waypoints to be used by
the flight control, including some fail-safe return-home
path in case the AAV loses ground-station connectiv-
ity. It is updated by the ground station via the command
and control (C&C) component, and amended by the sen-
sor filtering component for obstacle avoidance; the latter
component receives input from various sensors, includ-
ing camera and other sensor input via the CAN bus. Such
communication, including concurrency control between
components accessing the same data, must be possible
while guaranteeing critical deadlines.
In summary, an OS for mixed-criticality systems must:
• provide high-assurance spatial and temporal isola-
tion, to allow critical components to be assured in-
dependently of less critical ones;
• decouple criticality from priority, to ensure critical,
low-rate threads meet their deadlines;
• provide mechanisms that allow analysing the timeli-
ness of critical tasks, even if they communicate with
less critical ones;
• have well-understood temporal behaviour, espe-
cially bounded and known WCET for all operations;
• be highly assured for correct operation.
No such OS exists to date. We present the design and
implementation of such an OS, based on the seL4 mi-
crokernel for single-core systems. seL4 is an attractive
starting point, as it is a high-assurance OS kernel that has
been comprehensively verified [Klein et al., 2014], and is
the first and still only protected-mode OS in the literature
with a complete and sound WCET analysis [Blackham
et al., 2011].
We do not claim to have invented new scheduling
models or theory. In fact, the system we present in Sec-
tion 3 is, as scheduling theory goes, known as static
mixed criticality [Baruah et al., 2011]. Our claims are
about practical systems, specifically:
1. the design of a low-overhead temporal resource
management model that is based on a small number
of simple, policy-free mechanisms, suitable for a
high-assurance implementation, matches the above
requirements of MCS but also supports a wide range
of other uses (Section 3);
2. its implementation in the seL4 microkernel in a way
that retains seL4’s general-purpose nature and veri-
fiability1 (Section 4);
3. an evaluation that demonstrates that the modifica-
tions do not unduly impact seL4’s performance, and
support low-overhead implementations of different
real-time and best-effort scheduling models (Sec-
tion 5).
2 Background and Related Work
In the rest of this paper, and this section specifically, we
talk about general real-time concepts as well as OS ab-
straction. Specifically there are two related concepts re-
lating to the execution model. We will use the term task
in the sense established in the RT community, namely
a set of related jobs which jointly provide some system
function, where a job is a unit of work that is scheduled
and executed by the system [Liu, 2000]. We use the term
(kernel-scheduled) thread to refer to the execution ab-
straction familiar to the OS community. The term “job”,
which we will not use further, corresponds to a unit of
work that is conducted by a thread, while “task” maps
onto a thread, plus code and data.
In short, we will use “task” when referring to general
RT issues, and “thread” when talking about a specific OS
concept. In practice, the terms are largely interchange-
able.
2.1 Scheduling models vs. mixed criticality
RT scheduling generally assumes periodic tasks, which
maps well onto typical control systems, where differ-
ent activities execute periodically albeit with different
periods. Non-periodic (“sporadic”, i.e. interrupt-driven)
tasks are incorporated in such a model by requiring a de-
fined minimum arrival time, corresponding to a maxi-
mum interrupt rate, which is used as the task’s period
for the schedulability analysis. RT tasks have a deadline
by which a computation must be finished. The general
assumption is that deadlines are implicit, meaning the
deadline is the end of the period.
As discussed in the introduction, the ability to over-
load, while guaranteeing critical deadlines, is core to
the notion of MCS. Classical RT scheduling approaches
1We have not formally re-verified the modified kernel, and only
claim that our modifications are moderate in terms of kernel changes
and no more difficult to verify than the baseline kernel.
2
have a notion of (fixed or dynamic) priority as the
sole determinant of access to CPU time, with equal-
priority tasks (if permitted) being (preemptively or non-
preemptively) scheduled FIFO. If the system is over-
loaded, this means that the lowest-priority deadlines are
missed. When using RMPA, this victimises the tasks
with the lowest rates. In effect, criticality equals rate in
RMPA.
The main alternative to RMPA is earliest deadline first
(EDF) scheduling. This is a dynamic priority scheme,
which at any time schedules the task with the closest
deadline. Unlike fixed-priority schemes, such as RMPA,
EDF is optimal on a uniprocessor in that it can schedule
any task set, as long as the total utilisation does not ex-
ceed 100%. However, the dynamic prioritising implies
that under overload, EDF drops deadlines of all tasks
[Buttazzo, 2005], meaning that there is no concept of
task criticality at all.
MCS require control over which deadlines will miss in
the case of overload: those of the tasks with low critical-
ity (called LOW tasks from now on), while guaranteeing
deadlines of HIGH tasks, irrespective of scheduling pri-
ority. This requires a mechanism for limiting CPU time
of high-priority tasks.
An established way of providing isolation is through
scheduling reservations [Mercer et al., 1993, Oikawa
and Rajkumar, 1998], where a reservation guarantees
a certain share of the CPU to a periodic task. Such
schemes are popular in soft RT systems, e.g. multime-
dia, and some allow slack time to be used by best-effort
tasks [Brandt et al., 2003]. Scheduling reservations can
be implemented as sporadic servers for RMPA [Sprunt
et al., 1989] and with constant bandwidth servers (CBS)
[Abeni and Buttazzo, 2004] on EDF.
Reservations present a guarantee by the kernel that the
reserved bandwidth is available. This means that they
do not support over-committing. Also, the kernel must
perform a schedulability analysis as admission control
whenever a reservation is created. Schedulability tests
can be complicated and frequently constitute a trade-off
between cost of the test and achievable utilisation.
Recently the concept of a mode switch was introduced
to support mixed criticality [Burns and Davis, 2014]:
when the system is unable to meet its deadline, it enters a
high-criticality mode, where the priority of HIGH tasks is
boosted above all LOW tasks. To achieve this, HIGH tasks
are assigned multiple reservations, one per criticaly level.
In a two-criticality system, HIGH tasks have a pessimistic
WCET and an optimistic worst-observed execution time
(WOET). LOW tasks have just one estimate. When the
system is in LOW mode, HIGH tasks run according to
their WOET. If all reservations in this mode are schedu-
lable, temporal isolation is guaranteed. However, if a
HIGH task exceeds its WOET, the system switches to
HIGH mode, degrading LOW tasks and assuring assymet-
ric protection between HIGH and LOW threads without
falsely correlating rate and urgency.
2.2 Support for sharing and communica-
tion
As indicated in the introduction, integrity of critical com-
ponents must be assured even when tasks communicate
and share. In our AAV example of Figure 1, the mis-
sion plan component encapsulates waypoints. The HIGH
flight-control component must be able to access a consis-
tent view of the flight plan, despite the LOWER C&C and
other components performing updates.
Encapsulating the shared data and the code that ac-
cesses and modifies it into a single-threaded resource
server [Brandenburg, 2014] is a simple and effective way
to achieve the necessary transaction semantics. Obvi-
ously, this server has the criticality level of its most crit-
ical client, but must also act on behalf of a LOW client.
This creates a temporary criticality inversion where the
LOW client blocks the HIGH one. This is an unavoidable
consequence of sharing, and the design must ensure that
it does not cause the HIGH task to miss deadlines.
-
Priority inversion bound
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Figure 2: Comparison of real-time locking protocols
based on implementation complexity and priority inver-
sion bound.
There are multiple ways to achieve mutual exclusion
in fixed-priority RT systems [Sha et al., 1990], the most
common being non-preemptive critical sections (NCP),
the priority inheritance protocol (PIP), and the imme-
diate2 and original priority ceiling protocols (IPCP and
OPCP). For RT systems, the most important factor for
mutual exclusion is the bound on priority inversion,
where a low priority task blocks a high one. For efficient
systems, the concern is execution cache performance, for
secure systems the concern is the avoidance of channels.
Figure 2 shows the four protocols in terms of complex-
ity and priority inversion, none is a silver bullet. NCP
is simplest yet has the longest blocking time, IPCP re-
quires the priorities of all lockers to be known a pri-
ori, PIP has high implementation complexity and risks
deadlock if resource ordering is not used. OPCP is even
2Also known as highest lockers protocol and PRIO PROTECT in
POSIX.
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more complex, and requires global state to be maintained
across all locks in the system, which is not acceptable for
seL4 as it introduces covert channels and is incompat-
ible with seL4’s decentralised user-level resource man-
agement. We will show in Section 3.2 how IPCP can be
easily implemented without the kernel requiring knowl-
edge about critical sections.
As a mechanism for supporting sharing, Fiasco [Stein-
berg, 2004] introduced the idea of scheduling contexts,
separate to execution contexts (threads). Scheduling
contexts encapsulate priority, scheduling parameters and
accounting detail, and pass between threads over IPC.
Steinberg et al. [2010] extended this with bandwidth in-
heritance [Lamastra et al., 2001, Lipari et al., 2004, Fag-
gioli et al., 2010] over IPC. This is equivalent to PIP
combined with reservations. When an IPC from client
B arrives at a server S, who is serving a client A with an
expired budget, B budget is used to complete A’s request
such that B does not have to wait for A’s reservation to
be replenished. This kernel-implemented policy, also re-
ferred to as helping, prevents the server from choosing
alternatives which might be more appropriate in a partic-
ular situation, such as aborting A’s request.
The Fiasco design of scheduling contexts [Lackorzyn-
ski et al., 2012] is tied to the traditional L4 model of
sending IPC messages directly to threads, a model which
has been abandoned in modern L4 kernels (including Fi-
asco and seL4) as it introduces covert channels [Shapiro,
2003]. It is not supported on the later, capability-based
Fiasco.OC kernel.
Composite [Parmer and West, 2008] completely frees
the kernel from any scheduling policy by providing
mechanisms for hierarchical user-level scheduling. It
reduces overhead-related capacity loss by configuration
buffers shared between user-level and the kernel. Some
capacity loss remains as timer interrupts must be deliv-
ered down the scheduling hierarchy. This approach does
not suit seL4, as the required reasoning about concur-
rent access (by kernel and user-level) to those buffers
would drastically increase verification overhead [Klein
et al., 2014].
Unlike all L4 microkernels, Composite implements a
migrating thread model [Ford and Leprau, 1994]. This
implies that access to shared resources does not block,
thus avoiding priority inversion, although at the cost of
requiring all server code to be re-entrant, which is fairly
heavy-handed policy for a microkernel. Also, it only
shifts the problem, as mutual exclusion is still needed,
including a way of limiting priority inversions. Given
the challenges of getting concurrent code right, it should
be minimised in high-assurance systems.
Linux introduced an implementation of the POSIX
SCHED DEADLINE in 3.14, which implements EDF with
CBS for temporal isolation. However RT tasks in Linux
are higher priority than all other tasks in the system,
and cannot be over-committed (although cgroups allow
limiting the RT class to a certain share of the CPU).
Quest-V [Li et al., 2014] and PikeOS [Kaiser and Wag-
ner, 2007] are both separation kernels for multicore sys-
tems that dedicate cores to different criticalities. AU-
TOBEST [Zuepke et al., 2015] is another separation ker-
nel where the authors demostrate implementations of
AUTOSAR and ARINC653 in separate partitions.
2.3 seL4
seL4 is a high-performance OS microkernel with an
unprecedented degree of assurance: it features formal
proofs of implementation correctness down to the bi-
nary, proofs of spatial isolation properties (enforcement
of confidentiality, availability and integrity) and a com-
plete and sound analysis of worst-case execution times
on ARMv6 processors [Klein et al., 2014]. This assur-
ance makes seL4 an appealing candidate OS for critical
systems.
seL4 is designed to be a general-purpose platform,
supporting a wide range of use cases. This is a reason
why it has a strong emphasis on performance, as many
of the envisioned deployment scenarios are performance-
sensitive (e.g. mobile devices). Formal verification is a
strong motivator for generality: the cost of assurance is
best amortised if all use cases are supported by the same,
unmodified kernel [Heiser and Elphinstone, 2016]. As
the maintainers commit to re-verify any changes to the
mainline kernel, they are only interested in changes that
make the kernel more general, not more specialised.
2.3.1 seL4 overview
In line with the microkernel minimality principle
[Liedtke, 1995], seL4 only provides a small number
of policy-free mechanisms. Specifically it provides for
threads, represented as thread control blocks (TCBs), ad-
dress spaces, which are thin wrappers around hardware
page tables, and frame objects, which represent physi-
cal memory that can be used to populate address spaces
by mapping. It further provides port-like endpoint ob-
jects for synchronous (rendezvous-style) communication
and notification objects, which are essentially arrays of
binary semaphores.
Like other security-oriented systems, seL4 uses capa-
bilities [Dennis and Van Horn, 1966] for controlling ac-
cess to all spatial resources and providing complete me-
diation similar to KeyKOS [Bromberger et al., 1992] and
EROS [Shapiro et al., 1999]. Besides its assurance story,
seL4’s most characteristic aspect is its isolation-oriented
approach to memory management, which is made policy-
free by fully delegating it to user level.
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Specifically, the kernel never allocates memory. Af-
ter booting, seL4 hands all rights to any unused mem-
ory to the first user process in the form of capabilities
to Untyped memory. The only operation supported on
Untyped is to retype into some other object type (TCB,
page tables, frames etc), or to revoke of an earlier retype.
That way user-level managers have full responsibility for
any memory management. For example, the initial pro-
cess can partition Untyped memory into several disjoint
pools, and set up secondary resource managers in each
partition. The partitions are then totally isolated, unless
the initial process also provides access to some shared
resources (e.g. frames or endpoints) to support commu-
nication.
Like any kernel operation (other than the yield()
syscall which simply forfeits the remainder of the present
time slice), IPC and notifications are authorised by capa-
bilities: a thread needs an endpoint capability in order
to send or receive messages, and a notification capability
for signalling or collecting notifications.
Similar to other L4 kernels, the kernel not only sup-
ports basic send() and receive() operations, but also
two versions of a send followed by a receive in one
atomic syscall. First there is the RPC-like call(),
which is typically used by a client invoking a server.
When invoking call() on an endpoint, the kernel cre-
ates a single-use reply capability, which refers to a vir-
tual, temporary reply endpoint. The kernel delivers the
reply capability to the receiver listening on the endpoint,
and makes the sender wait on the reply endpoint.
The second combined call is reply receive(),
which sends a message to the (implicitly supplied) re-
ply endpoint and then makes the invoker wait on a new
request on the endpoint specified in the syscall. Once
used in the reply, the reply endpoint and capability are
removed.
2.3.2 Scheduling
Management of time is comparatively under-developed
in seL4. It presently implements the same simplistic
scheduling model used in most L4 kernels for 20 years:
priority-based round robin. The only controllable param-
eters are a thread’s priority and time slice. This is not suf-
ficient for supporting MCS, as indicated by the examples
given in the introduction.
On IPC, seL4 uses a direct process switch [Liedtke,
1993] where possible, to avoid the cost of invoking the
scheduler: the IPC switches context from sender to re-
ceiver, but with the receiver running on the sender’s time
slice, until it replies or is preempted. When rescheduled
after preemption, the server will execute on its own time
slice (and after replying to the client, the latter may ex-
ecute on the server’s time slice). The IPC paths which
do not require scheduler invocation are implemented by
separate, highly-optimised fast-path code.
This form of time-slice donation [Steinberg et al.,
2010] has been criticised as inappropriate for RT sys-
tems [Ruocco, 2008], as time is not accounted properly.
Consequently, the Fiasco L4 kernel allows the sender to
specify whether donation is permitted.
However, even without time-slice donation, traditional
L4 scheduling is problematic. Consider a typical sce-
nario of two clients, A, B, invoking server S. Both clients
have the same priority, which is lower than the server’s,
and the same time slice length, so they ought to get equal
amounts of time. Assume client A requests long-running
operations from S, while B’s requests are short. The
server’s time is not accounted against the clients, and
A gets a much higher share of the system than B. Fur-
thermore, if the scheduler is invoked on each IPC, A and
B will alternate execution after each server invocation,
making it very difficult to reason about the progress of
individual tasks. Alternatively, if A continues executing
after the invocation of S returns, then A can effectively
deny B’s service by invoking S in a tight loop.
In summary, the L4 model of managing time is un-
satisfactory no matter how it is implemented. The
bandwidth-inheritance approach taken in some kernels
[Steinberg et al., 2010] is not a good solution either for
the reasons explained in Section 2.2: on the one hand
there is the general issue of complexity and poor priority-
inversion bound of inheritance. On the other hand, inher-
itance offers no policy flexibility on managing overruns
in servers. Additionally, while Fiasco’s implementation
of bandwidth inheritance allows for bounded priority in-
version, it violates temporal isolation: A is allowed to
consume B’s budget.
2.4 Summary
We want a model that is simple enough to be suitable for
seL4, provides temporal isolation, and provides freedom
in the implementation of policies for dealing with iso-
lation violations. At the same time, it must continue to
support all existing or anticipated use cases of the kernel.
3 Scheduling Model
We now present a scheduling model for seL4 which sat-
isfies all requirements for MCS stated in Section 1. It is
based on a small number of abstractions, namely
• periodic threads with hard CPU bandwidth limits
• scheduling contexts
• timeout exceptions
• notion of criticality in addition to priority & explicit
mode switches.
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Our model matches the approach known as static mixed
criticality in scheduling theory [Baruah et al., 2011],
which provides appropriate tools for analysis.
3.1 Execution-time limits: Budgets
A key observation from Section 2.1 is that pure priority-
based scheduling cannot satisfy the requirements of
MCS, and we need a mechanism for temporal isolation.
To achieve this we introduce the notion of a budget,
which is a hard limit on the time a thread can consume
during a period. The ratio of budget over period is the
limit of CPU bandwidth a thread can consume.
Budgets are similar to the reservations introduced in
Section 2.1, except that the kernel makes no guarantee
that any bandwidth is achieved, only that the limit is
not exceeded. This makes admission control a user-level
responsibility, avoiding any policy in the kernel about
whether admission should be determined on- or off-line,
should be static or dynamic, or should be hierarchical of
flattened [Lackorzynski et al., 2012]. In particular, the
system designer may decide to trust a particular task not
to use its budget (except in emergencies) and perform the
schedulability analysis based on that knowledge.
Despite providing weaker guarantees, budgets are a
more powerful concept than reservations. Specifically, if
a set of reservations is schedulable, i.e. admission control
succeeds, then budgets will produce the same schedule,
i.e. they behave like reservations. If, however, the to-
tal is not schedulable, but the sum of all budgets above
some threshold priority p is, then all budgets of tasks
whose priority exceeds p still behave like reservations,
but nothing of priority ≤ p is guaranteed any CPU time.
This property allows us to safely overload a system
with predictable outcomes and without the kernel per-
forming any admission control. We will see later how
this example of less is more allows us to support MCS.
Specifically, we replace the kernel’s notion of a time
slice by two new attributes: period and budget. The
budget is less than or equal to the period and the ratio
specifies the maximum share (utilisation) of the CPU the
thread can possibly get. This is essentially the model of
sporadic servers introduced by Sprunt et al. [1989], ex-
cept that we use budgets instead of reservations.
The operation of the seL4 scheduler changes only
slightly: it still picks the highest-priority runnable thread,
using round-robin within a priority. The difference is that
when the kernel schedules a thread, it sets a timer to en-
force the budget, and a thread whose budget is expired
is no longer runnable. The period specifies when the
thread’s budget is replenished, thus making it runnable
again. Figure 3 shows some examples.
Similarly to the budget not guaranteeing any time, the
period does not guarantee that a thread is actually sched-
uled periodically (which depends on the priorities, peri-
ods, and budgets of all other threads with the same or
higher priority). Note also that this model exactly em-
ulates the existing seL4 scheduler when all budgets are
full: if every thread has a budget that is equal to its pe-
riod, the period has the same semantics as the time slice
used to have.
3.2 Scheduling contexts
In order to provide better control over the time resource,
we introduce a scheduling context (SC) object that grants
access to time. Instead of a time slice, a thread (in
its TCB) holds a scheduling context capability (scCap),
without such a valid scCap, the thread is not runnable.
The SC consists of the period, budget pair introduced
above and thus represents the maximum bandwidth a
thread may consume. The semantics of SCs are equiv-
alent to hard reservations in Linux/RK [Rajkumar et al.,
1998], in that once the budget is exhausted, no thread can
run on that SC until it is replenished, however they differ
in two ways. First, we only allow one thread per SC at a
time, but SCs can be passed between threads via IPC for
cooperative scheduling. This allows for a minimal, sin-
gle level scheduler in the kernel. Second, the kernel does
not conduct an admission test. Our SCs differ from those
of NOVA [Steinberg et al., 2010] in that priority remains
a thread attribute instead of being associated with an SC,
and we allow only one SC per thread.
SCs are like other seL4 objects, in that any thread that
can allocate memory can create them. However, setting
the budget requires special privilege, as creating budgets
amounts to control over the right to consume CPU time.
It must be authorised by a capability.
We use an approach that is analogous to managing
interrupt sources in seL4. Specifically, there is a per-
core virtual scheduling-control object, represented by the
sched control capability. This capability must be pre-
sented when setting the budget of an SC. The kernel cre-
ates this capability at boot time and hands it to the initial
task as part of the startup protocol.
Server	
Client2	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Client1	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure 4: Resource server implementation as a “passive”
thread without a scheduling context.
SCs provide a clean solution to the shared-server ac-
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P T B U u Schedule
3 5 1 0.2 0.2
2 10 5 0.5 0.5
1 20 20 1.0 0.3
(a) Two periodic RT threads plus one best-effort thread running in slack time.
P T B U u Schedule
2 1 1 1.0 0.5
2 1 1 1.0 0.5
1 1 2 1.0 0.0
(b) Three full-budget threads scheduled as in traditional L4.
Figure 3: Examples of thread schedules. P=priority, T=period, B=budget, U=max. utilisation, u=actual utilisation.
counting dilemma outlined in Section 2.3.2. We allow a
(server) thread without an scCap to wait on an endpoint,
we call this a passive server. If a client sends a mes-
sage to this endpoint, the IPC will transfer the client’s
scheduling context to the server, which then executes on
the client’s borrowed budget. The SC returns to the client
when the server replies to the client request. An example
is given in Figure 4, where an SC-less resource server has
two clients, each holding an SC (indicated by the clock
dial representing a CPU bandwidth bound). For security,
the sender must agree to the donation, the IPC will fail if
the receiver has no SC but the sender is unwilling to lend
its own. No SC transfer takes place if the receiver has its
own SC (active server).
A passive server can trivially implement the immedi-
ate priority ceiling protocol introduced in Section 2.2, by
setting its priority to the ceiling of priorities of all clients.
As any client needs a send capability on the server’s
endpoint, usermode managers can control access to the
server, and thus enforce the priority ceiling. We discuss
in Section 3.4 how we deal with the server running out
of budget.
notification_t ntfn;
sched_context s_sc;
tcb_t s_tcb;
void init() {
// bind SC to TCB
bind(s_sc, s_tcb);
// create server thrd
start_thread(s_tcb);
// block and allow
// server to run
wait(ntfn);
// server initialised
// convert to passive
unbind(s_sc);
}
notification_t ntfn;
endpoint_t ep;
void server() {
// run on init SC
initialise();
// signal & block
signal_recv(ntfn, ep);
while (true) {
// run on client SC
process_request();
// reply & block
reply_recv(ep);
}
}
Figure 5: Passive server initialisation.
Passive servers must be initialised with an initialisa-
tion SC and then communicate to the initial task when
they are done, such that the SC can be removed. We
support this with a new system call signal receive(),
which combines signalling a notification with an IPC re-
ceive. Figure 5 shows how initialisation works in princi-
ple.
Call-reply&wait IPC with SC transfer avoids invoking
the scheduler or updating accounting data during IPC,
and thus retains the low overhead of the direct process
switch optimisation. It has in fact many of the properties
of a migrating thread model [Ford and Leprau, 1994],
specifically it avoids having multiple schedulable enti-
ties for what is logically a single-threaded operation. The
advantage over migrating threads is that the kernel does
not have to provide stacks on the fly, and thus is free of
policy decisions such as determining stack sizes, charg-
ing for memory, whether to cache stacks. Instead, our
model requires explicit user-level management of stacks
through thread objects.
3.3 Managing thread execution
A periodic thread needs to suspend itself when it has fin-
ished processing for the current period. It does so by call-
ing yield() on its own SC.3 An event-triggered (spo-
radic) thread instead waits on its IRQ notification. Of
course, even if the notification is signalled (by an IRQ or
another thread), the sporadic thread will only execute if
it has budget.
Sometimes explicit changes of a thread’s priority are
needed, e.g. when implementing IPCP without encapsu-
lating the critical section into a separate server. In order
to change a thread B’s priority, thread A must hold a ca-
pability to B’s TCB. In order to prevent arbitrary priority
changes, we re-introduce the concept of a maximum con-
trolled priority (MCP) that was used in early L4 versions
[Liedtke, 1996]. Specifically, A cannot raise any thread’s
priority, including its own, higher than A’s MCP. Note
that this does not stop A from having a priority higher
than its MCP, but some other thread must have set it up.
We add two further operations on scCaps in order
to allow fine-tuning scheduling decisions. The first,
consume, obtains the total time accounted the designated
scheduling context since the last such enquiry.
3Authorising yield() with an SC capability removes seL4’s previ-
ous anomaly of having a syscall that requires no capability to execute.
yield() can also be called on another thread’s SC, cancelling that
thread’s current budget. However, we do not claim that there is a good
use case for this.
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The second, yieldto(), allows user level to manip-
ulate the kernel’s scheduling queues. When invoked on
a scCap, and the designated SC is presently associated
with a thread whose priority does not exceed the callers
MCP, and the thread has budget available in its present
period, then that thread is moved to the head of the ready
queue of its priority. This ensures that it is the next thread
to be scheduled if no higher-priority threads are runnable.
Invoking yieldto() implicitly invokes consume, i.e. it
returns and resets the time accumulated on the SC.
3.4 Budget overrun
We provide timeout exceptions in order to detect budget
overrun, analogous to seL4’s treatment of other excep-
tions. An seL4 thread already has an exception endpoint.
If an exception is triggered, the kernel sends a message to
the appropriate endpoint on the faulting thread’s behalf.
An exception handler waiting on the endpoint will then
receive the message and take appropriate action. By re-
plying to the exception message, it unblocks the faulting
thread (possibly after adjusting its instruction pointer to
skip an emulated instruction). In practice, many threads
share the same exception endpoint (and thus handler).
We extend this model by adding a timeout-exception
endpoint: the kernel sends a message to that endpoint
when the thread exceeds its budget, and the handler can
take appropriate action, which may include adjusting the
faulting thread’s budget. If the handler increases the bud-
get and then replies to the fault message, the thread will
continue to run on the remainder of the enlarged budget.
A thread without a timeout-exception endpoint is simply
rate limited.
Timeout exceptions allow recovering from prior-
ity/criticality inversions, as possible in the passive re-
source server of Figure 4. If the server’s borrowed SC
runs out of budget, its timeout handler can implement
appropriate policy, such as letting the server complete
the request on an emergency budget, forcing a reset or
roll-back, possibly coupled with taking some additional
safety precautions prejudicial to C1, such as suspending
C1 or affecting a criticality mode switch. This is in con-
trast to kernel-implemented helping schemes, which im-
plement a specific policy.
3.5 Criticality mode switches
Another case of budget overrun is the system shown in
Table 1, consisting of three HIGH tasks (pink) and two
LOW tasks (blue), plus T0 which runs in slack time. With
T4’s LOW budget of 2 units, this system is RMPA schedu-
lable — the RMPA utilisation bound for 5 tasks is 74%
— so all tasks will meet their deadlines.
C P T B U
T5 1 6 10 2 0.20
T4 1 5 20 2|7 0.1|0.35
T3 0 4 25 5 0.20
T2 1 3 40 4 0.20
T1 0 2 60 6 0.20
T0 0 1 100 100 0.00
Table 1: Parameters of a sample system, where T4 has a
LOW budget of 2 and a HIGH budget of 7. C=criticality,
P=priority, T=period, B=budget, U=utilisation.
Now assume that T4 overruns its budget, triggering a
timeout exception. The handler can adjust its budget to
the HIGH value of 7 units, however, the resulting sys-
tem is no longer schedulable. Since the 4-task utilisation
bound of RMPA is 75%, not only the LOW task T1 may
miss its deadlines, but also the HIGH task T2.
We can repair this situation by a criticality switch that
prevents LOW tasks, specifically T3 from competing with
T4. We support this by introducing an explicit notion of a
system criticality level, as well as a new thread criticality
attribute. When setting the criticality system level to C,
we boost the priority of all threads with criticality≥C by
a constant amount, so that they all have priorities above
any lower-criticality threads [Burns and Baruah, 2013].
In the above example, the timeout handler not only in-
creases T 4’s budget, but also raises the criticality level to
one.
The lowest-priority task T0 will only run if there is
slack in the system. If so, the criticality level can be reset
to zero (possibly after waiting for a few of T0’s periods).
We control thread criticality changes similarly to pri-
ority changes: a thread attribute maximum controlled
criticality (MCC) determines limits how a thread can
chance another thread’s criticality, just as the MCP lim-
its priority changes. Setting the system criticality level
requires the sched control capability.
4 Implementation
4.1 Objects and methods
We add a new 64-byte scheduling context object type,
and modify global state by eight words plus the num-
ber of criticalities. In TCB objects we replace the
timeslice) by the scCap, add a timeout handler ca-
pability, criticality, MCP, and a number of bookkeeping
fields, a total of nine extra fields. As TCB objects must
be powers of two in size, this has no effect on the size of
a TCB object.
We add three methods on TCBs. SCs have 5 meth-
ods, the new sched control has two. There are also
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three new methods for manipulating reply capabilities:
the ability to set your reply slot, save another threads re-
ply capability, and the ability to swap your reply capabil-
ity with one saved earlier. This extra flexibilty with reply
capabilities allows for more efficient user-level schedul-
ing via IPC, and allows the timeout handler to access the
faulter’s reply capability, so it can unblock the client on
the server’s behalf. Also new is nbsend wait.
4.2 Scheduling algorithm
Baseline seL4 has a ready queue, which satisfies the in-
variant that it contains all runnable threads except the one
presently executing [Blackham et al., 2012]. It is imple-
mented as a priority-indexed array of queues. A two-
level bitfield of occupied priorities ensures O(1) access.
The main change required to the existing seL4 sched-
uler is the addition of a release queue. A thread whose
budget expired before its period is up is removed from
the ready queue and inserted into the release queue. This
retains the existing invariant for the ready queue, while
the release queue is characterised as holding all threads
that would be runnable but are presently lacking budget.
The queue is ordered by the time of the threads’ next
budget refresh, i.e. the time their next period is up.
Whenever the kernel schedules a thread, it sets the
timer to fire when the thread’s SC’s remaining budget is
due to expire, or for the next wake-up time for the head
of the release priority queue (whichever is first). If an SC
switch occurs, because the timer fires or the thread blocks
without an SC transfer, the consumed time is subtracted
from the SC’s budget and added to the accumulated time.
On kernel entry (except on the fastpath, which never
leads to an SC change or scheduler invocation) the kernel
updates the current timestamp and stores the time since
the last entry. It then checks whether the thread has suf-
ficient budget to complete the kernel operation. If not,
the kernel pretends the timer has already fired, resets the
budget and adds the thread to the release queue.
This adds a new invariant that any thread in the
scheduling queues must have enough budget to exit the
kernel. This makes the scheduler precision equal to the
kernel’s WCET, which for seL4 is known (unlike any
other protected-mode OS we are aware of).
Threads are only charged if the scheduling context
changes, in order to avoid reprogramming the timer
which can be expensive on many platforms. Else, the
timestamp update is rolled back by subtracting the stored
consumed value from the timestamp.
4.3 Criticality
A core integrity requirement of MCS is that the time-
liness of HIGH tasks is unaffected by low tasks. This
includes the mode switch: its cost must not depend on
the number of LOW tasks in the system. We implement
criticality as follows.
The kernel supports base priorities in the range
[0,2Np −1], where Np is a kernel build option. The base
priority is the thread’s actual priority at system criticality
level zero. The number of criticality levels, Ncrit, is also a
build option. Typically, it is a small number, e.g. RTCA
specifies five levels. We require that Ncrit×2Np ≤ 1024.
For each criticality level the kernel maintains a queue
of threads, threads that are explicitly suspended (as op-
posed to out of budget or blocked in IPC) are not in any
criticality queue.
When system criticality changes from C to C′, the
kernel iterates through the criticality queues from C′ to
Ncrit − 1. For each thread in those queues, the kernel
changes the present priority P to P0∧ (C′ 8). This en-
sures that the priority of all HIGH threads is above those
of all LOW ones (with respect to C′).
The per-priority ready queues are doubly-linked lists
of TCBs, so moving a thread from one queue to another
is a constant-time operation. Hence, the total time for
the priority adjustments is proportional to the number of
threads at criticality C′ or higher.
If during a criticality increase the kernel detects any
threads that are running on a borrowed scheduling con-
text (comparing tcb->sc->home to tcb), and the SC’s
owner is LOW (tcb->sc->home->crit ≤ C′), it gen-
erates timeout exception for that thread. This allows
a server to abort any operation on behalf of a LOW
thread. If the thread running on an SC borrowed from a
LOW thread has no timeout hander, it will complete nor-
mally. In this case, the worst-case blocking time is the
worst-case server request time, plus the cost of the mode
switch.
Co-operative Preemptive
Shared SC IPC Timer notifications
SC per TCB Signals Timeout execeptions
Table 2: Mechanisms for user-level scheduling
4.4 User-level scheduling
The kernel provides fixed-priority scheduling with bud-
gets. This is a particular (although quite flexible) policy.
Fortunately, our mechanisms allow us to implement very
general policies, as indicated in Table 2.
For example, cooperative scheduling with an arbitrary
policy can be implemented with a shared SC, where the
threads cooperate via IPC, or per-thread SCs, where syn-
chronisation is via notifications (although it is unclear
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why one would want the latter). Pseudocode for both
variants is shown in Figure 6.
Similarly, arbitrary preemptive scheduling policies
can be implemented, Figure 7 shows pseudocode for
schedulers with shared or per-thread SCs. The shared-
SC case uses one SC for all threads, and a separate one
for the timer.
void coop_sched_s() {
reply_recv(ep);
p = t;
t = pick_thread(p);
swap_caller(t, p);
}
void coop_yield_s() {
//yield
call(ep);
}
void coop_sched_m() {
t = pick_thread(t);
signal(t->ntfn);
yieldTo(t->sc);
}
void coop_yield_m() {
//yield
wait(ntfn);
}
Figure 6: User-level cooperative scheduler and thread
yield function using a shared SC (left) and per-thread
SCs (right).
void pr_schd_s(prev) {
// wait for timer
wait(timer);
t = pick_thread();
// change sc over
swap_sc(t, prev);
program_timer();
ack_irq();
}
void pr_schd_m() {
// wait for timeout
recv(ep);
t = pick_thread();
// place at head
// of prio queue
yield_to(t);
}
Figure 7: User-level preemptive scheduler with shared
(left) and per-thread (right) SCs.
5 Evaluation
We conducted our evaluation on two machines, both con-
figured to use one core:
• Sabre: 1 GHz ARM Cortex A9 system on chip on a
Freescale i.MX6 SABRE Lite development board.
• Haswell: 3.1 GHz Haswell E1220v3 processor in a
server machine running in 32-bit mode (64-bit seL4
is in development).
5.1 Microbenchmarks
5.1.1 Kernel microbenchmarks
Figure 8 shows the cost of the (performance-wise) most
important kernel operations of our present implementa-
tion compare to the baseline seL4 kernel. Latency of the
Arch Operation Baseline RT Diff
Sabre
call() 279 282 +1%
replyrecv() 291 311 +7%
IRQ latency 467 578 +24%
signal() 107 111 +4%
Schedule 875 1242 +42%
Haswell
call() 412 415 +1%
replyrecv() 414 426 +3%
IRQ latency 952 1448 +44%
signal() 383 387 +1%
Schedule 972 1532 +58%
Figure 8: Microbenchmarks of seL4 baseline vs. RT ker-
nels, standard deviations are negligible.
main IPC send+receive operations increases by three cy-
cles (call) and by 12–20 cycles (reply&wait). These are
the result of extra checks on the fastpath to accommodate
scheduling contexts and ordering IPC, but the increase in
cost is clearly negligible. The same can be said for sig-
nalling a notification.
The actual cost of the model can be seen in the IRQ
and scheduler latency. Part of that is due to the need to re-
program the timer to enforce the budget, which is needed
on every scheduler invocation, but also on an IRQ, as this
normally unblocks a waiting handler. We measure the
cost of reprogramming the timer to be 55 cycles on the
Sabre, but about 200 cycles on the Haswell.
The rest of the increase is the result of the significant
extra code from dealing with scheduling contexts. Note
that scheduling is considered an expensive operation in
seL4, and happens much less frequently than IPC.
5.1.2 Mode switch
Criti- Threads ARM x86
cality boosted up down up down
3 4 1.4µs 1.7µs 0.4µs 0.5µs
2 12 2.4µs 2.4µs 0.5µs 0.6µs
1 28 4.3µs 3.7µs 0.8µs 0.7µs
Table 3: Results of switching from criticality level 0 to
the criticality listed in column 1. Column 2 shows the
number of tasks that need boosting. Standard deviations
are no more than 2%.
To evaluate the cost of changing the system critical-
ity level, configure the kernel with 256 priorities and 4
criticality levels (0–3). We then set up a system with 60
threads, of which 32, 16, 8 and 4 have criticality 0, 1, 2
and 3 respectively.
Table 3 shows the cost of switching criticality level
between zero and one of the other levels. For each data
10
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
Ti
m
e 
(µs
)
Number of threads
Linux
shared SC
multi SC
Figure 9: Execution time of yield operation measured
from user-level for CFS compared with Linux yield on
Haswell. Standard deviations are 2–3%.
point we took 10,000 measurements with a primed cache.
Table 3 shows the cost of switching criticality level
between zero and one of the other levels. As the table
shows, when switching to level three, the three threads at
that level need to be boosted, while a switch to level one
requires boosting all 28 threads of criticality greater than
zero.
The results show that a mode switch is fairly fast,
around 1,500 cycles on both platforms as long as the
affected number of threads is small (which is to be as-
sumed for HIGH threads), and cost is roughly linear in
the number of threads to be boosted. This is important,
as the schedulability analysis must allow for that cost.
However, the numbers shown in Table 3 are hot-cache
(best-case) numbers, while the criticality analysis must
be based on WCET.
Table 3 shows the number of threads for each critical-
ity and the results of the microbenchmark.
5.2 Case studies
5.2.1 Linux CFS
As an example of a complex dynamic-priority scheduling
policy implemented at user level, we implement a ver-
sion of Linux’ so-called completely fair scheduler (CFS).
The implementation uses a red-black tree and calls to
consumed() to adjust the weights. The scheduler runs
one seL4 priority above its clients.
Figure 9 shows the scheduling cost for two scenarios,
shared and per-client SDC. Cost is measured by taking a
time stamp in the client, which then calls yield(), with
another time stamp taken right after (in the next client
thread).
We also show the cost of the same operations under
Linux, which takes about 50–60% of the time. However,
this turns out to be mostly the syscall cost, as the Linux
yield() bypasses the scheduler. So, our user-level im-
plementation looks quite competitive.
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Figure 10: Execution time of EDF on Sabre and Haswell.
5.2.2 EDF scheduler
As a second scheduling policy we implement EDF at user
level, this time only the scenario with a shared SC. The
results are shown in Figure 10. The standard deviations
are very big, especially on the Haswell platform. This is
not unexpected, as the amount of work EDF has to do on
each scheduling operation is very sensitive to the present
state of the deadline and release queues. The scheduler
may have to release threads, reprogram the timer for the
next release, ack the previous interrupt and IPC the next
thread, or resume a preempted thread with yieldto.
We used the randfixedsum [Emberson et al., 2010] al-
gorithm to generate 10 EDF task sets for each of the 10
data points, with periods between 10–100ms. Each task
set ran 1000 times, for 10,000 runs for each data point.
A better metric in this case is the minimum sched-
uler time, shown in the figure as “Sabre min”, “Haswell
min”. It is reasonably stable around 2 µs for the Sabre,
and 0.5–0.9 µs for the Haswell platform. This is an ex-
cellent result: Cerqueria and Brandenburg [2013] mea-
sured the latencies of various in-kernel Linux schedulers
on a Xeon X7550 platform and found the minimum to
be around 1.5 µs for all schedulers. While comparions
across different hardware must be taken with a grain of
salt, the fact that latencies of our user-level implementa-
tion is a factor four less indicates that our performance is
competitive.
5.2.3 Network server
In order to demonstrate temporal isolation, we use a net-
work benchmark, specifically the Yahoo! Cloud Serving
Benchmarks (YCSB) [Cooper et al., 2010]. We run this
against a server using the Redis key-value store [Redis].
The server setup is shown in Figure 11. Dashed ar-
rows show synchronisation operations through notifica-
tions (semaphores) indicated by flags, with coloured,
broken single arrows indicating the direction of the sig-
nal. The OS server, which contains the IP stack and is
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Figure 11: Network server setup, explanation in text.
implemented as a passive server, presents a POSIX inter-
face, which is implemented by an RPC protocol through
an endpoint. The (active) Redis server invokes the OS
server (coloured, solid single arrow), which then runs
on Redis’ scheduling context. Redis and the OS share a
buffer for passing bulk data (black, solid double arrows).
The OS also shares a buffer with the Ethernet driver,
which uses a second notification (red) for signalling com-
pletion to the OS. That notification is “bound”, meaning
the signals are delivered to the waiting OS as an IPC ap-
parently coming from the endpoint.
Thread Prio Period Budget
Hog 254 1 ms variable
Driver 253 2 ms 2 ms
Redis 252 1 s 1 s
OS 252 - - - -
Table 4: Scheduling parameters of network server setup.
Not shown is a separate CPU hog thread, which does
not communicate with this setup, but is competing for
CPU time. The hog runs at highes priority (254) with a
1 ms period. The Ethernet driver runs at priority 253
We use the budget of the hog to control the amount
of time left over for the server configuration. Figure 12
shows the bandwidth achieved by the YCSB-A work
load as a function of the available CPU bandwidth (i.e.
the complement of the bandwidth granted to the hog
thread). The figure also shows the total CPU idle time.
The graph shows that the server is CPU limited (very
low idle time) and consequently throughput scales lin-
early with available CPU bandwidth.
5.2.4 Server rollback
As an example of a shared server running out of budget,
we implement the scenario of Figure 4 of a passive server
with two clients. The server is providing an encryption
service using AES-256 using a block size of 16 bytes.
The server alternates between two buffers, of which one
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Figure 12: Throughput of Redis YCSB workload A vs
available bandwidth, also showing idle time.
always contains consistent state, the other is dirty during
processing.
When the server runs out of budget, its timeout fault
hander gets invoked. It rolls the server back to the last
consistent state and makes it ready for the next client.
We measure rollback time, from the time the fault han-
dler is invoked, until the server is ready for the next re-
quest. Given the small amount of rollback state, this
measures the baseline overhead, for servers with more
state, the handling that state would have to be added.
We run this on the Sabre and find a mean rollback time
of 12 mus, with a 31% standard deviation on 12 runs with
a cold cache. The individual times fluctuated between 9
and 24 mus.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Mixed criticality systems are gaining traction in avionics
and the automotive sector, due to the SWaP issues cre-
ated by mushrooming functionality. In order to get the
full benefit of MCS, we need an OS supporting strong,
but asymmetric temporal isolation. Inherent in the no-
tion of MCS is also a requirement for high assurance.
While there is a wealth of theory about MCS, little of
it is implemented in more than a proof-of-concept, cer-
tainly not in a high-assurance OS. We have identified a
model for temporal resource management that lends it-
self to efficient and policy-free implementation in a high-
performance and high-assurance OS. We have imple-
mented this in seL4, and have demonstrated that the base
model supports the efficient implementation of a range
of different scheduling policies, and allows efficient han-
dling of various emergencies.
Presently the main limitation of the work is the restric-
tion to a single core, which is the target of future work,
as is the formal verification of the real-time seL4 kernel.
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